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the Public versus Economists 
 




WHY IS THE DISTASTE FOR INFLATION SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER 
for the average layperson than for the average economist? In the latest 
edition of his intermediate text, Macroeconomics (2007b, 97-8), N. Gregory 
Mankiw puzzles over this conundrum. “If you ask the average person why 
inflation is a social problem, he will probably answer that inflation makes 
him poorer,” writes Mankiw. People believe that inflation hurts their real 
buying power. But “[t]his complaint about inflation is a common fallacy.” 
Inflation does have costs—Mankiw elaborates on shoe-leather costs, menu 
costs, and tax distortions, among others. But the magnitude of these costs, 
as measured by economists, is significantly smaller than the public seems to 
think. “Apparently, inflation worries the public much more than it does the 
economics profession,” but Mankiw remains perplexed as to exactly why. 
The puzzle appears in earlier editions of Mankiw’s intermediate text 
and his best selling principles text (2007a, 676) as well. It also graces the 
texts of other authors. In Macroeconomics (5th ed.), Robert E. Hall and John 
B. Taylor (1997, 480) write that the “public’s negative view of inflation 
seems to come from sources other than these identifiable costs of 
inflation.” Perhaps “some people may be upset about inflation because they 
do not take the same broad view as an economist, who sees inflation as a 
general rise in all prices and dollar incomes.” Similarly, David Romer 
reports in his graduate text, Advanced Macroeconomics (2006, 547): “There is a 
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INFLATION TAX 
wide gap between the popular view of inflation and the costs of inflation 
that economists can identify.” 
Empirical verification of this difference of opinion can be found in 
an article by Robert J. Shiller (1997), “Why Do People Dislike Inflation?” 
Shiller extensively surveyed Americans, Germans, and Brazilians, 
discovering that they all hate inflation. Eighty-four percent of Americans 
either strongly or somewhat agree with the statement: “The control of 
inflation is one of the most important missions of U.S. economic policy.” 
Most of them believe that inflation erodes living standards. The economists 
Shiller surveyed, on the other hand, were far less concerned. Mankiw (1997) 
contributed a three-page comment on Shiller’s article to the same 
collection, in which he suggests that people may be associating inflation 
with negative supply shocks. 
Yet one obvious aspect of this conundrum seems to have been 
entirely overlooked by mainstream macroeconomists. Mankiw 
unintentionally hints at it in his principles text when he discusses “The 
Inflation Tax,” just a few pages before getting into inflation’s costs. The 
costs that concern economists are inflation’s deadweight loss, its negative 
effect on net welfare. But that is only a part of the losses that concern the 
public. No one has problems understanding why people complain about 
the income tax, despite the fact that those complaints arise from more than 
just the tax’s deadweight loss. People cannot help also noticing the transfer 
of some of their income into the hands of government. The fact that the 
tax may pay for programs they favor is a separate issue.  
Similarly, the general public is no doubt conscious of inflation’s 
implicit tax on their cash balances, the source of government seigniorage. 
The public’s belief that on average inflation reduces their real buying power 
is in fact technically right—despite the offsetting gain to government. Even 
if all prices rise in lock-step together, whatever money people hold declines 
in purchasing power.  The longer they hold it or the more severe the 
inflation, the greater the decline. Moreover, unlike income and other taxes, 
which people in democratic countries may think they have some control 
over through voting, the seigniorage tax appears utterly beyond their 
control. This separates it further from any allegedly beneficial government 
programs that it may finance. In fact, people are often aware of their loss 
without realizing at all that government is gaining.    
Admittedly the magnitude of the inflation tax is much lower than that 
of the income tax, at least in developed countries like the United States. 
Equaling total government seigniorage, it is best measured as the real 
additions to the stock of base money (i.e., high-powered or outside 
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money)—rather than the concomitant flow of annual interest that the 
government saves by issuing base money in lieu of debt—because people 
experience most of the transfer as a decline in the purchasing power of 
their existing cash balances. (That portion of base money growth that does 
not manifest itself in inflation still transfers resources from the public to the 
government, as will be elaborated on below). I estimate that during the high 
inflation of the 1970s in the U.S. seigniorage thus measured covered close 
to 2 percent of total federal outlays. This agrees with Haslag (1998, 19, n. 
2), while Fischer (1982, 308) and Mankiw (2007a, 90) put the number at less 
than 3 percent of government receipts, which have consistently been below 
outlays. With government outlays hovering around 20 percent of GDP 
throughout the 1970s, we have an implicit tax that was not more than 0.4 
percent of GDP.1 Today it is even lower at the low levels of inflation that 
the United States has experienced over the last few decades. Because so 
many dollars are now held abroad, what little seigniorage the United States 
extracts is partly imposed on foreigners. Which is why public complaints 
about inflation have been recently quite muted, if not nonexistent. But 
however low the seigniorage tax, it still necessarily adds a burden felt by 
taxpayers on top of the deadweight loss. 
Moreover, given that the poor hold a higher proportion of their 
wealth in the form of cash balances than do the rich, the incidence of this 
implicit tax is regressive. It may even encompass individuals that the federal 
government does not otherwise tax. Finally, we should add that the period 
when U.S. inflation hit double digits, the 1970s, was before financial 
deregulation became comprehensive. With checking accounts unable to 
legally pay any interest and savings accounts facing interest rate ceilings that 
were not fully phased out until 1986, the erosion of cash balances tended to 
be extended from the monetary base to the broader monetary aggregates, 
M1 and M2, increasing the loss imposed on money holders. To be sure, 
some of that additional loss was a gain to commercial banks that was 
eventually competed away through non-price competition and financial 
innovation. NOW accounts, with interest-bearing checking, were first 
issued by Massachusetts and New Hampshire mutual savings banks in 
1972, and later money market mutual funds blind-sided the depositories. 
                                                                                       
1 Fischer (1982, 308) estimates 0.5 percent of U.S. GDP for 1973-78. For comparison, see 
Fischer’s seigniorage estimates for other countries, as well as those of Haslag (1998), whose 
sample of sixty-seven countries over the years 1965 to 1994 finds that seigniorage averaged 
about 2.0 percent of total output, ranging between as low as 0.25 percent to as high as 9.98 
percent (for Ghana).  See also Click (1998). 
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But here again, those who could most readily escape the loss of purchasing 
power were the most financially savvy, that is, the wealthy.      
Inflation broke 10 percent at only two points during the 1970s, both 
times assisted by supply shocks. Mankiw’s suggestion that the public failed 
to differentiate the two effects has much merit. Therefore, let us explore 
what would have been the seigniorage take from a steady-state, double-digit 
inflation fueled exclusively by monetary expansion. By the end of the 
decade, the ratio of the monetary base to GDP had sunk below 6 percent.2 
Assuming a constant real growth rate of 3 percent and no further changes 
in base velocity, the base would have had to grow by 13 percent annually to 
sustain 10 percent inflation. Seigniorage under those circumstances would 
have been almost twice as great, consistently taking nearly 0.8 percent of 
GDP. 
A simplified diagram as adapted by Lawrence H. White (1999, 147-8) 
from Martin J. Bailey’s classic analysis of seigniorage (1956) provides insight 
into this tax and is shown in Figure 1. Since only increases in base money 
generate seigniorage, assume for a moment that the money multiplier 
remains constant. In that case, changes in the base are proportional to 
changes in the total money stock, and the real demand for base money is 
proportional to the real demand for the total money stock. Further assume 
no changes in output, and no changes in income velocity other than those 
brought about by changes in expected inflation, or what is equivalent, that 
output and velocity rise at the same rate except when inflationary 
expectations change. Finally, consider a steady state where expected 
inflation equals actual inflation. Let B represent the stock of base money 
and P the price level, so that real seigniorage for any given period equals 
(∆B)/P. 
Under those assumptions, the rate of expected inflation will equal the 
rate of base money growth, and the real demand for base money, (B/P)D, is 
a decreasing function of that growth, as depicted in Figure 1. (Any point 
along this curve represents a constant ratio of income velocity to output, 
although moving from one point to another involves a once-and-for all 
change in velocity relative to output.) Notice the similarity with the 
standard analysis of transfers and deadweight loss from explicit taxes. At 
any given positive rate of base money growth, you will have a rectangle 
                                                                                       
2The figures I always use for the monetary base are unadjusted for changes in reserve 
requirements. I have found that the more widely reported base figures adjusted for changes 
in reserve requirements are seriously misleading in this and many other contexts. For 
instance, for 1980 the unadjusted monetary base was $158.6 billion while the adjusted 
monetary base was only $142.0 billion. 
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representing the seigniorage transfer from the public to the government, 
(∆B/B)(B/P) = (∆B)/P, and a triangle representing the deadweight loss. 
 
Figure 1:  
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This welfare loss results from inflation inducing people to hold less 
base money. It includes so-called “shoe-leather costs,” a term that trivializes 
and misleads about the resulting increased transaction costs. But the 
triangle does not necessarily include other costs of inflation, such as tax or 
relative-price distortions. Nor does it include inflation’s now well-
established negative impact on growth. The triangle also ignores any 
distorting impact of other monetary interventions, among them deposit 
insurance and reserve requirements. Reserve requirements shift the demand 
curve for base money outward, at least at low levels of inflation.3 Deposit 
insurance presumably makes the inside money created by banks more 
attractive than currency and therefore has the opposite impact, unless that 
is offset by a simultaneous public shift out of less liquid financial 
instruments to inside money, with banks increasing their reserves in 
response. I know of no study that takes into account the welfare 
implications of these distortions of base money demand.  
Notice that the diagram can even illustrate unanticipated inflation. If 
expected inflation is zero, for instance, the holding of base money will be a 
vertical ray where the demand curve crosses the horizontal axis, as in Figure 
2. At the same rate of base money expansion as in Figure 1, seigniorage is 
greater but deadweight loss is less (in this case zero). The full loss to money 
holders is now approximately double the steady-state deadweight loss plus 
the steady-state seigniorage. The case where expected inflation is greater 
than zero but less than actual inflation could also be represented; it is a case 
with some welfare loss, while at the same time total losses to the general 
public rest somewhere between those for fully anticipated inflation and 
those for completely unanticipated inflation. 
Complicating the diagram to make it more realistic unfortunately 
poses certain problems that have been exposed in an important but 
neglected Milton Friedman article (1971). Most attempts to estimate 
inflation’s welfare loss replace monetary growth on the vertical axis with the 
nominal interest rate, which incorporates anticipated inflation. This change 
ostensibly permits analysis when the growth of real output is positive. Yet 
this version of the graph obscures exactly where a constant monetary base 
and therefore zero seigniorage lie. Early studies measured deadweight loss 
from the horizontal line representing price stability, with the real and 
nominal rates of interest equivalent. But this will only correspond to 
                                                                                       
3See White (1999, 150-3) for the impact of reserve requirements on base money demand, 
and particularly, why at significantly high rates of inflation reserve requirements actually 
decrease that demand.  
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freezing the monetary base when velocity and output rise at the same rate. 
As Friedman has pointed out, growth of population or per capita output 
increase the demand for base money, ceteris paribus, making it possible for 
the government to extract seigniorage from the issue of new money even 
without any inflation. (Growth simultaneously causes the diagram’s demand 
curve to shift outward, but that can easily be accommodated by changing 
the horizontal axis to measuring base money demand as a percent of 
nominal GDP.)   
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Other studies put the baseline for determining deadweight loss at the 
famous Friedman (1969) optimum where deflation makes the return on 
base money equal the risk-free real rate of interest. Whatever else can be 
said for Friedman’s optimum—and there is an extensive literature on the 
subject4—it is not necessarily the appropriate standard for isolating the 
deadweight loss from seigniorage alone. It will be so only if the rate of 
economic growth exceeds the growth of base velocity by exactly the real 
rate of interest. At any lower growth rate, Friedman’s optimum can only be 
realized if government generates negative seigniorage (either in the form of 
interest on base money or a monetary contraction), which in turn must be 
financed by other taxes with their own deadweight loss. Friedman’s 
optimum then becomes essentially a world where the government is partly 
paying back the public for past seigniorage. Nonetheless, real growth for the 
U.S. from 1960 on has generally exceeded by a few percentage points 
growth in base money velocity, despite the fact that any rise in the money 
multiplier shows up as a rise in base velocity. Thus, the Friedman optimum 
remains a better baseline for measuring seigniorage’s deadweight loss than 
does zero inflation.  
Actual estimates of the welfare loss from a 10 percent inflation in the 
United States necessarily depend upon specifying the demand function for 
money. Stanley Fischer (1981) estimated 0.3 percent of GDP. Robert Lucas 
(1981) came up with 0.45 percent of GDP, but his higher estimate was 
based on the demand for M1 rather than for the monetary base, because he 
wanted to capture the deadweight loss from interest-rate restrictions. Kevin 
Dowd (1994) arrived at a much lower figure for M1: only 0.12 percent of 
GDP. Thomas F. Cooley and Gary D. Hanson (1989) used a different 
method to reach similarly low results. Rather than allowing the demand for 
money to vary, they calibrated a real business cycle model, allowing output 
to vary while constraining velocity. With 10 percent inflation, holding base 
velocity constant caused GDP to fall by 0.112 percent, while holding M1 
velocity constant caused GDP to fall by 0.387 percent. 
All the studies mentioned so far used zero inflation as their baseline 
and are consequently biased downward. Martin Feldstein (1997), in 
contrast, bases his estimates on the Friedman optimum. He calculated the 
annual welfare gain to base money demand if inflation was reduced from 
only 2 percent to 0 percent at 0.02 percent of GDP. Using his method and 
parameters, I determined that the welfare loss from a 10 percent inflation 
was 0.73 percent of GDP. But Bennett T. McCallum’s graduate textbook 
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(1989, 124-8) employed the demand for M1 to estimate a welfare loss of 
only 0.28 percent of GDP even with Friedman’s lower baseline. Max 
Gillman (1995), a proponent of the Friedman baseline, compared these and 
myriad other studies, some of which employed the partial equilibrium 
approach illustrated in Figure 1 and others of which employed an approach 
similar to Cooley and Hanson with a general equilibrium model. Gillman 
reports that their estimates of the annual welfare loss from a 10 percent 
inflation vary all the way from 0.11 to 7.15 percent of real GDP.5 But after 
compensating for failure to use the Friedman baseline as well as other 
factors, he concludes that the reasonable range is between 0.85 and 3.0 
percent of GDP. Even the low end of Gillman’s reasonable range for 
deadweight loss exceeds the potential seigniorage from a sustained 10 
percent inflation, 0.80 percent of GDP, suggesting that seigniorage quickly 
degenerates into a very inefficient tax. 
Yet for explaining public fears about inflation, perhaps we should 
conservatively confine ourselves not to the potential losses from a 10 
percent inflation but to the actual losses suffered in the U.S. during the 
1970s. Recall that we only know for certain that government’s seigniorage 
gain was approximately 0.4 percent of GDP. If people had been expecting 
zero inflation throughout the decade, then that percentage represents the 
entire loss to the general public. The inflation of the 1970s, however, was at 
least somewhat anticipated. We therefore must add some welfare loss to the 
seigniorage, possibly doubling the result to 0.8 percent of GDP. Still a small 
number, it could hardly be the only thing that makes people dislike 
inflation. Other factors that economists have speculated about could be at 
work, such as greater uncertainty (including uncertainty about the 
magnitude of the levy on cash balances), the unanticipated transfers 
between members of the general public, the difficulty of distinguishing 
relative price changes from inflation, and perhaps some money illusion. But 
that hardly justifies economists ignoring or being indifferent to dollars that 
inflation takes from the public and gives to the government. 
So long as we are considering unanticipated inflation, we should also 
briefly mention other ways that inflation contributes to government 
revenue. There are two. First, unanticipated inflation benefits net debtors at 
the expense of net creditors, and government is the economy’s largest 
debtor. Second, inflation enhances explicit taxes either through bracket 
creep or through taxes on saving. Here again, as in the work of Fischer, 
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GDP, correcting it to 0.17 percent.  
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Lucas, and Feldstein cited above, economists have focused mainly on the 
resulting welfare losses rather than the transfers. Although bracket creep 
was eliminated from the income tax, it was a major factor during the 1970s 
(and is today enjoying a minor resurrection with the alternative minimum 
tax). Yet we can ignore the impact of inflation on explicit taxes under the 
plausible assumption that it directly feeds public dissatisfaction with those 
taxes rather than with inflation. 
On the other hand, investors in Treasury securities undoubtedly 
attributed their below expected and even negative real returns during the 
1970s to inflation. (Any offsetting gain through reduction of future real 
taxes required to finance government debt, even in the unlikely event that it 
was correctly and fully anticipated, was surely not credited to inflation.) And 
like seigniorage, this expropriation appears more arbitrary than normal 
taxes. My admittedly crude estimate of this transfer’s magnitude during that 
decade, based on comparing the nominal change in the debt with the real 
change, is 5.0 percent of federal expenditures or 1.0 percent of GDP. This 
is an upper-bound estimate of the additional interest government would 
have had to pay on Treasury securities if investors had correctly anticipated 
inflation. I was unable to fully adjust for inflationary expectations raising 
nominal interest rates, although I have eliminated the component of the 
deficit financed through seigniorage. If the inflation of the 1970s had been 
perfectly anticipated, there obviously would have been no transfer 
whatsoever.6
At first glance, this loss, however high, may appear to be 
concentrated on the wealthy. But commercial banks held about 25 percent 
of Treasuries at the beginning of the 1970s, and member banks have always 
been indirectly required to do so, at capped returns, through their shares in 
the Federal Reserve. To that extent, government partially recaptured 
whatever real gains accrued to banks from issuing interest-restricted M1 
and M2 liabilities. In any case, when added to our seigniorage estimates 
above, we now have the actual inflation of the 1970s costing the general 
public potentially as much as 1.8 percent of GDP, much of it ending up in 
government coffers. As a percentage of consumption, that amounts to 
around 3.0 percent.  
                                                                                       
6The work of Robert Eisner—notably (1989; 1986); and Eisner and Pieper (1984)—has done 
the most to call attention and even celebrate this effect of inflation. But he is unconcerned 
with the unanticipated transfer and, like me, has no estimates of how much of the real 
reduction of government debt was offset by higher Treasury interest payments. 
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Why the apparent failure of economists to consider the tax transfers 
resulting from inflation? Partially I suspect a holdover from the days when 
Keynesians still believed that there was a long-run trade off between 
inflation and unemployment. They therefore tended to minimize inflation’s 
costs. This was exemplified as recently as 1987 in Alan Blinder’s popular 
book, Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society (1987, 
51). “I am forced to conclude,” he wrote, “that inflations’ most devout 
enemies exhibit verbal hysteria.” The losses from inflation “appear to be 
quite modest—more like a bad cold than a cancer. . . . As rational 
individuals, we do not volunteer for a lobotomy to cure a head cold. Yet, as 
a collectivity, we routinely prescribe the economic equivalent of a lobotomy 
(high unemployment) as a cure for the inflationary cold.” 
Today, as Feldstein (1997, 123) points out, “[t]here is now 
widespread agreement in the economics profession that ‘high’ rates of 
inflation have significant adverse consequences and that these adverse 
effects justify the [temporary] sacrifices in employment and output that are 
generally needed to reduce inflation.” But he hastily adds that “[t]here is . . . 
much less professional support for the goal of ‘price stability’.” Most 
macroeconomists now favor a low but still positive rate of inflation. Partly 
this reflects fears of unanticipated deflationary shocks. But primarily—as 
attested by the Taylor Rule, essentially a nominal GDP target—
macroeconomists still believe that central banks have some role to play in 
dampening fluctuations in output and unemployment. And central banks 
can play that role more safely if the trend rate of inflation gives them room 
for tightening money growth without inducing any price declines. 
Even the public finance literature, which quite openly recognizes 
seigniorage as a tax, reinforces the tendency among economists to ignore 
the loss to the public. Having become obsessed with determining the least 
inefficient mix of seigniorage and other taxes, much of this literature verges 
toward viewing seigniorage as a net benefit, because it allegedly reduces 
distortions from other taxes. Inflation, claims McCallum (1989, 129), just to 
cite one instance, “provides a benefit in the form of reduced tax 
collection.”7 Although the assumption that government expenditures 
remain fixed may be the proper approach for some economic questions, it 
clearly does not illuminate public objections to taxation.  
In the final analysis, the public may indeed overestimate the costs of 
inflation, even after counting their losses through seigniorage and other 
transfers to government. Yet macroeconomists are guilty of 
                                                                                       
7Phelps (1973) initiated this perspective. 
ECON JOURNAL WATCH                                                                                                           56 
INFLATION TAX 
underestimating the public’s losses by forgetting this usually small but still 
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